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Chapter 11
Minorities of Indo-Pakistani Origin
Michel Adam
Translated by Shruti Singhal
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the population of Kenya 
includes minorities of Indian or Pakistani origin whose number 
(approximately 100,000 people, or 0.3% of the total population) is unrelated 
to their economic, social and cultural importance (Nowik 2010, 132–33).
At the crossroads of several cultural and linguistic areas (Bantu, 
Nilotic, Cushitic, Arab-Swahili), Kenya is an ethnically composite country, 
populated by successive waves of migration over the past centuries. If most 
of the country’s ethnic groups are of African descent, other groups—despite 
the fact that they may have established in Kenya long ago in history—
were coming from more distant territories, in any case outside of the 
African continent. This is the situation of the Arab and Persian minorities, 
established on the coast of the Indian Ocean since the beginning of the 
Middle Ages, or of the populations from the Indian subcontinent discussed 
in this chapter.1
Compared to its western coast, which is facing the desolate expanses of 
the Atlantic Ocean, the eastern coast of the African continent opens onto 
an inland sea dotted with islands. From Yemen to the south of India, it is 
bordered by lands which were once populous and prosperous, and by means 
of a regular regime of trade winds, lend themselves to important human 
and commercial exchanges. Navigating at high speeds, big dhows coming 
from the coast of India could—and can still today—reach unhindered the 
coasts of Africa and Madagascar from the beginning of the winter monsoon 
(October to March) and return during the summer monsoon to their home 
ports in favour of the inversion of the trade winds. Closely associated 
with the African settlements of the Arabs and Persians since the sixteenth 
century, various Indian traders from the regions of Gujarat and Sindh did 
not fail, as the Portuguese navigators testified, to arm ships coming from 
India and the Persian Gulf, occasionally financing cargo caravans within 
1. The curious reader will find much more complete information on the subject 
in the book that the author published in French (Adam 2010), and its English 
translation (Adam 2016). Other sources of information include Adam (2004; 2006). 
The English translation of the 2006 text, published in 2010, is seriously flawed 
(“A Microcosmic Minority: The Indo-Kenyans of Nairobi,” in Nairobi Today: The 
Paradox of a Fragmented City, see: http://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvk3gmfc.11).
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the African continent and engaging in local trade activities in Zanzibar, 
Pemba, Mombasa and as far as in the northern parts of Kenya’s coast.
If the presence of Indians on the Kenyan coast is ancient, their settlement 
in the interior of the country is comparatively recent: it dates from the 
late nineteenth  century and corresponds to the establishment of British 
colonies in Eastern Africa.
From the beginnings of British colonisation, the British East Africa 
Protectorate, a sparsely populated territory and climatically welcoming to 
European immigration, became, in the eyes of the colonial authorities, a 
sort of extension of the Indian empire geographically quite close and easy 
for marine access. While the use of the Indian rupee as an instrument of 
exchange became dominant in the country, the small staff of the African 
colony (clerics, domestic, policemen and soldiers) were recruited on a 
voluntary basis in the northern and western provinces of the sub-continent 
(Baluchistan, Punjab, Gujarat, Kerala). In order to ensure the rapid 
construction of a railway linking Mombasa to the protectorate of Buganda 
and because they were anxious to distinguish the professional qualities of 
an already trained workforce, the British called on 35,000 skilled Indian 
workers (masons, blacksmiths, carpenters, surveyors, drivers, mechanics, 
etc.) to work in Kenya. After most of these contract workers were returned 
to their country at the completion of the railway, several waves of voluntary 
immigrants succeeded in the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
Almost all of these migrants were from intermediate castes (craftsmen 
and technicians, skilled workers, traders, employees) who came to make a 
fortune in the country. By settling in the cities but also in the intermediate 
villages and in the proximity of the peasant populations, these newcomers 
understood very quickly that the African population, which the British 
incited to enroll in a monetary economy, represented a very vast market 
(Gregory 1993, 11).
Like in South Africa, Indian immigration to Kenya—and to East Africa 
in general—was encouraged by the colonial authorities. Following the 
expansionist and imperialist aims of Cecil Rhodes, the British had in 
mind that a vast Indo-African confederation could be ruled from India. 
In this imperial context characterised by large demographic disparities 
and significant inequalities in technical development, the purpose of 
population movements was to ensure a better distribution of the human 
resources, necessary for the development of each province. In Kenya, 
a territory of a great future already promised to an important European 
settlement but devoid of resources of intermediate level manpower (e.g. 
technicians, tradesmen, administrative staff), the colonial power strove to 
gather the human means susceptible to work on what was called at the time 
“development” (mise en valeur), even sketching the idea (yet abandoned 
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before the 1920s) of a massive installation of Hindu Patel small farmers2 in 
the distant hinterland of the port of Mombasa and around Kisumu. In the 
period between the two wars, Indians quickly exceeded Europeans. From 
44,000 individuals in 1931, the number of Indians reached 177,000 in 1962, 
or 2% of the total population, and almost 20% of the urban population.
Like in other imperial spaces where the logic of colonial confinement 
ruled, the socio-economic and socio-cultural model of the ethnic division 
of labor was applied even without being establishing institutionally. This 
system of territorial exploitation followed two regulatory principles:
• First principle. The colonial society was made up of three specialised and 
hierarchical community groups: 
 —the Europeans, about 30,000 people at the end of the colonial 
period, who, after seizing the best lands, reserved for themselves the 
very remunerative functions of agro-export exploitation (tea, coffee, 
cotton, etc.), general administration and command; 
 —Africans, confined to reserves, were dedicated to food production; 
under the control of the British administration, some of them were 
mobilised for subordinate services (domesticity, forced labor) and to 
serve as auxiliaries to large export agriculture; 
 —Indians were assigned to economically and socially intermediate 
tasks, which were themselves divided according to the community 
specialisations related to the caste system. They were appointed 
with trusted administrative responsibilities (state employees, health 
personnel, police officers, postal and railway staff), or were whole-
sale and retail traders, qualified technicians, service providers, small 
industrial contractors. Overtime, they encroached, as far as possible, 
on the privileges of Europeans, gradually controlling a growing 
share of industry, banking and insurance, gaining access to many 
liberal profession positions thank to their first-class university de-
grees, thus becoming lawyers, architects, doctors, pharmacists, etc.
• Second principle. The three production and community entities were 
deemed complementary, not in competition. Enclosed in specific and 
largely exclusive activities, these communities exchanged goods and 
services but were not (or only marginally) competing economically. 
Thus, Indians were (legally) excluded from agricultural activities while 
Africans were banned from export farming and removed (de facto) from 
trade and industry.
These three communities remained physically and socially separated 
in accordance with the principles of colonial apartheid, which was not 
a legal but a de facto partition in force until the threshold of the 1960s, 
and materialised through the system of African “reserves,” residential 
2. Patel: caste of peasants and traders from north-western India.
Michel Adam
316
segregation in the city, segregation at school, in hospital and in society, 
strict endogamy, etc. Without endorsing the apartheid principles of which 
they were also the victims, the Indians made do with—and in some respects 
profited from—the tripartite division of labour and communal separation 
which reflected the division of castes still in force in India.
As secondary actors in the anti-colonial struggle, and being unpopular 
among the African population, East African Indians suffered from 
xenophobic reactions in the aftermath of African independence with 
partial expulsion and massacres in Zanzibar, mass expulsion in Uganda 
(Prunier 1990), and discriminatory measures in Kenya. At the end of a 
period of uncertainty corresponding to a strong demographic regression, 
they nevertheless preserved over the years their social and cultural 
characteristics while consolidating their economic power over the country.
1. Main Characteristics  
of the Indian Diaspora in Kenya
Also present in the other countries of Eastern and Southern Africa (Tanzania, 
Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa), minorities of Indian 
origin in Kenya mainly live in major cities (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, etc.) 
Some of them also reside in secondary urban centres, including the most 
remote rural villages. Since the first years of independence, the significant 
reduction in their demographic importance has been accentuated by the 
considerable increase in African population, and even more in the urban 
population. From 2% of the total population in 1962, their numbers fell to 
0.7% in 2010 and to 1.5% of the urban population instead of 20%.
The diaspora of Indian origin has, for two or three decades, been 
partially renewed by the more or less clandestine influx of migrants from 
India. The latter are often eager, at the end of a first professional experience 
in Africa, for a migratory rebound towards a Western country. Typically 
recruited from the Internet and from the middle class, this recent wave is 
mostly made up of young single graduates, facing unemployment in their 
home country, as a result of positive discrimination measures in favour 
of “low castes” and “disadvantaged classes,” also called “scheduled casts” 
or “backward classes” respectively (Jaffrelot 2002). These new expatriates 
are attested in several branches of industry, banking, import export and 
international hotels. Equipped with a high level of qualification (especially 
in IT, commerce and management), low wage requirements and poorly 
welcomed by most Africans, these new expatriates are nicknamed rockets 
(“rockets”). Evaluating their numbers is all the more difficult as many of 
these young workers are undocumented and have obtained residency status 
through bribery (Adam 2010, 29–30; see also Prunier 1998).
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On its side, the Indo-Kenyan population of older stock maintains over 
generations the geographic dispersion of some of its members, both in East 
Africa and in a limited number of English-speaking countries, from the 
United Kingdom to North America to Australia. In their eyes, this propensity 
for mobility shows the capacity for reconversion associated with the family 
geographical break-up, but without calling into question—as will be seen 
below—the claim for the status of autochthones which people of Indian 
origin living in Africa frequently make.
Originally, in the great majority of the north-west of the subcontinent 
(Gujarat, Punjab, Maharawra, secondarily Kerala, and Pakistani Sindh), the 
Indian diaspora in Kenya has no less form a sort of cultural concentrate 
of India or apart from the political dimension, like “India in reduction.” 
Almost all the social and religious communities in India are represented, 
but in different proportions than in the former metropolis: more Muslims 
(35 to 40% instead of 14%), and among these, a significant proportion of 
Shiites (40% instead of 13%, including a large proportion of Ismailis); more 
“classes” or “castes” averages, and very few low or very low castes, among 
which the untouchables are absent. Finally, among Hindus, representatives 
of schismatic organisations form very large minorities (15% of Jains instead 
of 0.3% in India, 8% of Sikhs instead of 1.8%). Other minorities which are 
tiny in India, such as Christians or Pârsis, are also over-represented in 
Kenya (10% Christians instead of 3%, 0.05% Pârsis instead of 0.01%). This 
prevalence of religious minorities maintains highly tolerant behaviour 
among all communities (Adam 2010, 32–33).
The Indians are grouped into 100 community associations formed by 
reference of the following three criteria of belonging: denominational 
membership, caste (or, for Muslims and Sikhs, the professional corporation 
that stand for it), and the region of origin. Community associations are 
instances of sociability and cultural and ceremonial animation, mutual aid 
and cooperation, and legal protection. They own their religious buildings, 
their recreation centres, their clubs, and wherever possible, their schools, 
hospitals, credit societies, radio-TV stations, and so on. In the case of 
certain communities (Ismailis and, to a lesser extent, Bohra), the association 
leaders possess as delegates supranational religious authorities and have 
quasi-sovereign powers: they raise taxes, control the allocation of credit, 
register acts of civil status, manage health and social services, administer 
sanctions, etc.
Although divided religiously and statutorily, the Indo-Kenyans are 
nonetheless united by the feeling of a common belonging as well as, for 
the most part, by the same geographical origin and by the existence of 
a widely shared cultural heritage: language (Gujarati or Hindi), etiquette, 
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social, dress and culinary usages, secular rituals (almost all of Hindu origin, 
but commonly observed by Muslims and Christians).
The feeling of unity, which is reactivated in situations of xenophobic 
pressure, is further reinforced by the fact that in the diaspora situation, Indo-
Kenyans are generally perceived by Africans (who are often ill-informed 
of the complex differences that separate the different communities) as 
belonging to a single socio-cultural entity. Sometimes neglected—or even 
decried—in inter-community relations, the community of belonging feeds 
on the external gaze or even more on threats made by others.
2. The Place of the Indians  
in Multi-Ethnic Kenyan Society
In the aftermath of independence, when called to choose between 
departure and integration into a new socio-political group, the Kenyan 
Indians chose a middle way: they preferred to establish in the country but 
refused full integration as they were invited to do by the new authorities. 
Successive Kenyan governments accepted this compromise—concerned, 
for their part, not to jeopardise sectors of activity considered vital for the 
prosperity of the country—and respected a kind of self-segregation among 
Indian communities contrary to the principles of diversity advocated by 
the paladins of independence. The new situation that had thus just been 
created was in several times detrimental to the immigrant communities, 
yet it was to continue until today. Its characteristics can be described as 
follows:
1. Partial survival of the community and statutory division of labour;
2. Displayed willingness to preserve the culture of the origins;
3. Low social and political integration.
1) Despite the denial by the independent Kenyan state of the formalised 
framework of the old ethnic division of labour (statutory barriers, 
corporatist protections, social segregation, etc.) and the competition of 
Indians with Africans concerned about promotion economic and social, 
the Indians have maintained and greatly expanded their hold on trade and 
industry activities in many ways. Having acceded to the British ownership 
of the main means of production, they now control about 80% of industrial 
branches (agri-food, textile, metallurgy, pharmacy, plastics, paper and 
packaging, chemistry, etc.), a growing share of agribusiness (fruit and 
vegetables), tourism and hospitality, 50% of banks and insurance, the bulk 
of retail, wholesale and retail of the press and advertising agencies which 
is a very important fraction of real estate activities and liberal professions 
(Adam 2010: 45–52). In Indian-controlled enterprises, recruitment takes 
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place on family and community bases, with African staff being, with some 
exceptions, maintained in low professional positions.
The professional compartmentalisation associated with the caste 
has lost its binding character nowadays, yet the division of professions 
specific to each community still corresponds, to a certain extent, to ancient 
corporatist traditions: leatherworking, goldsmithing, laundry, metallurgy, 
textiles, bank, etc. Due in large part to the inertia of acquired situations 
(transmission of knowledge and capital), these technico-professional 
continuums—which are frequently modernised and brought up to date—do 
contribute to an Indian stranglehold on certain branches of activity.
In the current distribution of professions, we observe interesting 
symbolic transpositions that are quite similar to those encountered in 
Europe in the history of the old corporations. This is how Soni (jewelers) 
are today jewelers and watchmakers, but also sellers of curios; Dhobi 
(whiteners) have the monopoly of Dry Cleanings while Mochi (shoemakers) 
are industrial and shoe merchants; Wanza Darji (tailors) are industrial and 
clothing traders; the Nayee (barbers) are frequently doctors and surgeons; 
the Sutar (carpenters) are building contractors, etc.
2) Socially, Indians remain very weakly integrated into African society. 
The old segregation imposed by the colonial tutelage has been replaced 
by an informal self-regulation that leaves little room for a social and 
cultural mix: separate residential neighbourhoods, denominational schools, 
community hospitals, social and sports clubs, etc.
One of the first reasons for this social isolation, stemming from very 
ancient prescriptions of the Hindu culture, resides, according to the Indians 
themselves, in the repulsion with regard to natural and organic matters—
earth, blood, bodily substances—commonly manipulated by Africans and 
generally placed by their counterparts in the symbolic register of the 
impure. Attached to the chtonian rites, consumers of alcohol, beef and 
animal blood, operators of the human body (on the occasion of the initiation 
ceremonies), the Africans are opposed in all, by their religious and daily 
practices, to these canonical preventions, as they are in any case displayed 
by orthodoxy. One of the consequences of this opposition is the almost 
total absence of commensality between Indians and Africans as expressed 
in the register of food and inter-corporal contact.
Secondly, community endogamy, which was inherited from religious 
and statutory prescriptions, resists the temptations of mixed marriage, even 
within the diaspora itself. While religious endogamy (still very strict) itself 
contributes to limiting inter-marriages between Indians and Africans to a 
small minority of Sunni Muslims (Shiism having practically no followers in 
East Africa), ethnic endogamy, in the broad sense, represents, in the eyes of 
the Indians, only an enlarged form of caste endogamy. At the same time, it 
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seems to be self-evident as caste endogamy, for most of the part, has retained 
its dissuasive force. Thus, there are very few Indo-African marriages, but low 
percentages are nonetheless on the growth, especially among young people 
with higher education from a foreign country. Moreover, these marriages, 
when they exist, are always limited to the union of a man of Indian origin 
and of an African woman, a formula which inevitably leads—because of the 
patrilineal rule—to the absorption of wife and children by the husband’s 
family. It thus excludes the opposite hypothesis of the insertion of a woman 
of Indian descent and her descent into African culture.
The logic of community confinement has two complementary effects: it 
limits the impregnation of African cultures among representatives of the 
diaspora—except for the use of the Swahili language generally adopted by all 
Indians; and it contributes greatly to the preservation of the Indian culture 
of origin (religion, language, clothing, food, social code, aesthetics, etc.), a 
culture that remains foreign and frequently indecipherable to Africans.
3) The weak involvement of the Indian diaspora in the political life of 
their host countries is another aspect of community juxtaposition with East 
Africa. Indians form informal pressure groups, sometimes very intricate 
in circles of power. Yet, with some exceptions, they do not participate in 
public political debates, show little partisan commitment and despite the 
political alliance attempts initiated after independence, they delegate very 
few representatives in the local or national deliberative instances.
3. Identity Issues and the Future of Indians in Kenya
In many respects, however, the situation of the Indians does not correspond 
to the caricature of xenophobic slogans which make them foreigners in 
Kenya and emissaries of rival interests. Kenyan Indians, like all East 
African Indians, have largely broken their ties with the homeland of their 
ancestors. Although India remains a place of occasional pilgrimage and an 
unsurpassed reference to revitalise the culture of origins (music, dance, 
literature, cinema, etc.), it has become a foreign land, socially, economically 
and politically speaking as well as in terms of family connections, and is in 
no case represents a possible reverse migratory appeal. For most of them, 
the Indians of Kenya have been settled in Africa for several generations 
and a majority hold Kenyan citizenship, so much so that they can as just 
be considered as Africans of Indian origin, being Indo-Africans or Asian-
Africans as they name themselves.
In ways similar to the South African Indians but distinct from the West 
Indians and the Indonesians, the identity situation of the Kenyan Indians 
is original and, in some respect, hitherto unseen. Interlocked identities, in 
the first place, are remarkable. Born in Kenya, an Indian from the diaspora 
engages, successively or simultaneously, half a dozen identity references: 
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his family, the geographical and social environment of his childhood, his 
vernacular language, his religious community, his caste (or what stands 
for it), his two vehicular languages (Swahili and English) and the cultural 
environment of its insertion his modern life (school, profession, social 
environment, etc.), and his citizenship (Kenyan). Moreover, and in a 
complementary way, as certain religious denominations are minorities—a 
dominant pattern in East Africa, with the Ismailis, the Bohra, the Jain, 
the Pârsis, etc.—, transnational community attachment has become the 
privileged protective reference, beyond the nation-states. As mentioned 
earlier, this is how the Ismailis, for example, find in the Aga Khan institutions 
quasi-state services (e.g. bank, judiciary, hospital, education, etc.). Such 
transnational ties facilitate the establishment of industrial, commercial and 
financial networks. The frequent dispersion of the families—a phenomenon 
that is independent from economic expansion—continuously maintains the 
link with other regions of the world and cosmopolitan references. Already 
influenced by several cultures (Indian, Anglo-American, African) and 
multiple identities (Indo-community, national-African), many families of 
the diaspora are disseminated across the globe due to the contingencies 
of academic curricula (children enrolled in Anglo-Saxon universities) or 
to secondary emigration (other African countries, North America, Europe, 
Australia, etc.). National identity, which Africans reproach Indians for not 
being attached to—though they are themselves not always attached to it 
more than to another regional or clan identity—is not, however, negligible 
value for the Indians. But it connects to other identity referents that 
compose complex individual trajectories, and in some ways always unique. 
The problem of the Indians is then no longer to choose between several 
trajectories situated both within and outside their person; it is rather 
to discover the way to make these multiple components coexist whilst 
respecting their duties as citizens and the laws of their host country.
The array of cultural characteristics specific to Indo-Africans in general 
evokes the description by Arjun Appadurai (2001) of the “postmodern 
diasporas” as well as the notion of the “end of the territories” used by 
Bertrand Badie (1995). In many ways, these scattered minorities are the 
illustrations of globalisation on the move across the globe. Without exclusive 
territorial ties, they deploy their activities on a transcontinental scale and 
communicate easily with their distant correspondents in a world without 
borders. However, they have not given up their identity ties. The reference 
to largely reconstructed or imagined cultural resources—for example, in 
the territorial references of ancient castes in the distant and abstract past—
revives Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” and the mobilisation 
of their respective “ethnoscapes” (Anderson 1996).
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Are they citizens of their countries and citizens of the world? It is almost 
in these terms that in East Africa a minority of political activists pleading for 
integration present themselves against the conception of the “isomorphism 
of the extremes” between territory, origin and religion. Without partisan 
belonging and political ties, they plead the cause of citizen integration 
(national preference in economic matters, fiscal citizenship, opening of 
companies to African leaders, etc.), without denying the diversity of their 
cultural references or their cosmopolitan attachments. Represented by 
lawyers, teachers, doctors, and tradesmen, these activists display that their 
links with Africans and sometimes give the example of social mix through 
marriage. Despite the support of the liberal press (Nairobi’s Daily Nation, 
for example), their commitments, however, are currently largely unheard 
of by the public.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, let us to return to a debate that has stirred the African and 
Indo-African intellectual circles for a number of years and briefly above 
mentioned.
As Kenyan citizens, the question arises—once again—whether Kenya’s 
Indians can be considered “Africans,” that is, indigenous or autochthones 
in this country, or not? In other words, at what point does one stop being 
a foreigner or allochthone, knowing of course that in all countries of 
the world, most but if not all autochthones are former allochthones. To 
define autochthony is apparently, therefore, about assessing how long ago 
establishment in a particular place happened. It goes without saying that an 
answer in terms of temporal depth calls other questions of a socio-cultural 
nature. Indeed time is not a condition in itself here, but a simple factor 
of one of the way more fundamental attributes of the identity of “native,” 
namely, not so much the erasure as such of the previous origins but the 
irreversibility of immigration defined as the impossibility of a return to that 
origin.
Considering this important clarification, we can call “autochthone,” in 
the general sense of the term, any person who can not avail themselves of 
other family ties as well as social and socio-cultural ties than in the country 
of their birth. To put it differently, it defines a person who cannot envisage, 
even as a possibility, a return to the country of their forebears, even in the 
hypothesis that such a country could be identified.
Just like the Maasai—who arrived in the country just 250 years ago—, the 
Indo-Kenyans are at home in Kenya. The curious walker can discover on 
the shores of the Indian Ocean, a few kilometres north of Mombasa but at 
some distance from any human settlement, a Hindu temple set in a marine 
cave, partially covered by the waves at high tide. This temple is still very 
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popular with the faithful of the neighbourhood and can be dated more than 
200 years, and it is not impossible that it is much older. No African has ever 
thought of questioning the legitimacy of Indians to hold this temple on the 
African soil of their ancestors.
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